Latin American Perspectives on Trump's Goal to Dominate the Region
Throughout Latin America, the prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House has sparked a complex mix of anxiety, strategic calculation, and resignation. While some right-wing leaders express admiration for Trump's strongman style, the prevailing mood across the region is one of uncertainty regarding how a second Trump administration would approach trade, migration, and security. Many policymakers fear a return to the transactional and often punitive diplomacy that characterized his first term. In Venezuela, the regime of Nicolás Maduro views a Trump presidency with deep apprehension. Trump's previous tenure featured intense 'maximum pressure' sanctions aimed at forcing Maduro from power. Although those sanctions crippled the Venezuelan economy, they ultimately failed to dislodge the regime. Officials in Caracas worry that a new Trump term could bring even harsher measures, but they also fear that a Democratic continuation might lead to a slow lifting of sanctions they view as ineffective. It is a paradox where they dislike the sanctions but also believe they provide leverage. Colombia, historically the United States' closest ally in the region, faces a delicate balancing act. President Gustavo Petro, a leftist, had a frosty relationship with Trump. However, Colombia remains heavily dependent on US aid for counter-narcotics operations. A return of Trump could strain ties over drug policy, especially if Trump resumes his rhetoric of military intervention against cartels. Meanwhile, the Colombian government is preparing for potential mass deportations of migrants, a policy Trump has promised to aggressively pursue. Mexico, the United States' largest trading partner, is perhaps in the most precarious position. President Claudia Sheinbaum has taken a pragmatic approach, signaling willingness to cooperate on migration and security to avoid the tariff threats that Trump frequently wields. Mexican officials remember the heavy pressure during Trump's first term regarding the USMCA trade agreement. The fear of economic decoupling or massive tariffs is a potent weapon that Trump holds over Mexico City, forcing a more cautious diplomatic posture than under the Biden administration. In Brazil, the return of Trump could embolden the forces of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who maintains a strong affinity for the American conservative movement. However, the current administration under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva prepares for a clash over environmental policies, particularly regarding the Amazon, and trade protections. Lula has positioned himself as a leader of the Global South, and a confrontational US president would allow him to rally domestic support by framing himself as a defender of Brazilian sovereignty against American imperialism. Economically, the region is bracing for the potential impact of US interest rates remaining high, a scenario more likely under a Trump administration focused on domestic growth at all costs. This would strengthen the dollar and put pressure on developing Latin American economies. Trade relationships are also at stake. Trump has historically shown disdain for multilateral trade deals, preferring bilateral agreements that favor the US. Countries like Chile and Peru, which have relied on open markets, may find their access to the American market restricted if protectionist policies return. Migration remains the single most volatile issue. Trump has promised the largest deportation operation in US history. This threatens to overwhelm border infrastructure and destabilize countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, which rely on remittances from their citizens in the US. Latin American governments are scrambling to create contingency plans for receiving potentially millions of deportees, many of whom have no jobs or housing waiting for them back home. Security cooperation is another area of friction. While Latin American nations want US help in combating transnational criminal organizations, they reject any hint of military intervention. Trump's erratic style makes it difficult for regional partners to plan long-term security strategies. There is a pervasive sense that Trump views the region primarily through a lens of threats—illegal immigration and drugs—rather than as a partner for development or a region of geopolitical importance. Despite the fears, there is a school of thought in the region that believes Trump's unpredictability could be used to Latin America's advantage. Some leaders argue that Trump's willingness to make deals with authoritarian regimes, such as his engagement with North Korea's Kim Jong Un, could lead to a pragmatic engagement with the Maduro regime in Venezuela or the Ortega regime in Nicaragua. However, this is a risky bet, as Trump has also shown a willingness to abandon allies abruptly. The internal politics of the US election are also watched closely. Many Latin American elites prefer a stable US partner, even if it is a Democrat, over the volatility of Trump. However, populist leaders in the region see Trump's success as a validation of their own political projects. They view his attacks on the media, the judiciary, and the electoral system as a playbook they can emulate. Ultimately, Latin America is preparing for a scenario where the US turns even more inward. The region is seeking to diversify its relationships, looking toward China, Europe, and within Latin America itself to reduce dependence on the United States. Yet, the sheer size of the US economy and its proximity mean that no Latin American country can fully insulate itself from Washington's decisions. The consensus in the region is one of grim preparation: expecting a storm of tariffs, deportations, and diplomatic insults, and hoping to weather it without permanent economic damage.
